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Relaxed lending standards, lending without retaining residual risk, and financial engineering
led to a large expansion of mortgage credit that resulted in the over-origination and over-leveraging
of poor quality mortgage securities products in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis.
The over-origination of these poor quality assets has been attributed to a lack of skin-in-the-game
by the parties making lending and structuring decisions in the securitization chain. The proposed
credit risk retention rules, promulgated pursuant to Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act, attempt
to fix the flaws in the residential mortgage securitization process that led to the financial crisis
by closely aligning the economic interests of parties in the securitization chain, namely by craft-
ing the Qualified Residential Mortgage (“QRM”) safe-harbor to risk retention narrowly, and by
prohibiting a securitizer from profiting off of a securitization pool that ultimately fails by estab-
lishing a premium capture cash reserve account. These proposed rules are currently under attack
by a variety of commentators who seek to expand the definition of the QRM safe-harbor and ease
other restrictions associated with the proposed rulemaking. This Comment examines the proposed
credit risk retention rules as they apply to residential mortgages and considers responses to the
rules from consumer advocates, politicians, trade groups, and financiers. In spite of the opposition
to the proposed rules, this Comment urges regulators to maintain most elements of the proposed
rulemaking, including the narrow QRM definition and restrictions on hedging because they attack
certain crucial problems that contributed to the recent financial crisis. However, this Comment
proposes a modification of the premium capture cash reserve account concept in a manner that
would better encourage private label extension of safe credit.
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ABSTRACT 
Relaxed lending standards, lending without retaining residual risk, 
and financial engineering led to a large expansion of mortgage credit 
that resulted in the over-origination and over-leveraging of poor 
quality mortgage securities products in the years leading up to the 
2008 financial crisis. The over-origination of these poor quality 
assets has been attributed to a lack of skin-in-the-game by the parties 
making lending and structuring decisions in the securitization chain. 
The proposed credit risk retention rules, promulgated pursuant to 
Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act, attempt to fix the flaws in the 
residential mortgage securitization process that led to the financial 
crisis by closely aligning the economic interests of parties in the 
securitization chain, namely by crafting the Qualified Residential 
Mortgage (“QRM”) safe-harbor to risk retention narrowly, and by 
prohibiting a securitizer from profiting off of a securitization pool 
that ultimately fails by establishing a premium capture cash reserve 
account. These proposed rules are currently under attack by a variety 
of commentators who seek to expand the definition of the QRM 
safe-harbor and ease other restrictions associated with the proposed 
rulemaking. This Comment examines the proposed credit risk 
retention rules as they apply to residential mortgages and considers 
responses to the rules from consumer advocates, politicians, trade 
groups, and financiers.  In spite of the opposition to the proposed 
rules, this Comment urges regulators to maintain most elements of 
the proposed rulemaking, including the narrow QRM definition and 
restrictions on hedging because they attack certain crucial problems 
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that contributed to the recent financial crisis. However, this 
Comment proposes a modification of the premium capture cash 
reserve account concept in a manner that would better encourage 
private label extension of safe credit. 
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On October 19, 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) filed a complaint alleging fraud against Citigroup for its role in 
structuring and marketing a collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) that 
derived its value from subprime mortgages.1  Although investors in the 
CDO lost hundreds of millions of dollars once the subprime bubble 
burst, it was alleged that Citigroup realized net profits of at least $160 
million for arranging the CDO.2  Making matters worse, the complaint 
alleged that Citigroup selected and marketed $500 million worth of the 
assets in the CDO without disclosing to investors that it had entered into 
short positions on those assets by purchasing credit default swaps 
(“CDS”), thereby placing its economic interests adverse to those of the 
investors in the CDO.3  Citigroup entered into a settlement agreement 
with the SEC, agreeing to pay a $285 million fine to squash the 
complaint, without admitting any wrongdoing.4 
Similarly, on April 15, 2010, the SEC filed a complaint alleging 
fraud against Goldman Sachs for its role in marketing a CDO to 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Complaint at 1, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 7387 (JSR)). 
 2. Id. at 3. 
 3. Id. at 2. 
 4. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011).  The settlement agreement was initially rejected by The Honorable Jed Rakoff, 
United States District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York, “primarily 
because it included no admission by Citigroup of liability.” SEC v. Citigroup Global 
Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 161(2d Cir. 2012) (citing SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 
827 F. Supp. 2d at 335).  The Second Circuit, however, later granted a preliminary 
injunction, staying the proceedings in the District Court pending the outcome of the 
appeal on the merits, suggesting that Judge Rakoff erroneously rejected the settlement 
agreement. Id. at 168–69.  To this date, the appeal of the District Court order is pending 
in the Second Circuit. 
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investors that derived its value from subprime mortgages.5  Specifically, 
the complaint alleged that Goldman failed to disclose that a hedge fund 
with economic interests directly adverse to those of investors in the 
CDO played a significant role in selecting the assets that collateralized 
the CDO.6  Investors in the CDO lost over one billion dollars while the 
hedge fund’s CDS exposure to the CDO yielded a profit of 
approximately one billion dollars.7  Goldman, which did not retain an 
economic interest in the CDO, collected $15 million from the hedge 
fund for marketing the CDO to investors.8  Goldman ended up paying a 
$550 million fine to the SEC to settle this complaint without admitting 
any wrongdoing or liability.9 
These two proceedings exemplify the flaws in the originate-to-
distribute model of mortgage securitization that helped precipitate the 
2008 financial crisis (“Financial Crisis”).  Because the parties making 
lending and structuring decisions in the securitization chain were 
exposed to minimal credit risk on the underlying loans and received fees 
in proportion to the size of the deals they created, they were incentivized 
to cut as many deals as possible, which encouraged shady, and even 
predatory, lending and structuring practices.10  This model led to the 
over-origination of trillions of dollars worth of poor quality residential 
mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) products,11 which, through 
financial engineering, infiltrated the balance sheets of many large 
financial institutions.12  Once it became apparent that RMBS products 
and their derivative offspring, CDOs, were not investment-worthy, 
investors dumped these products en masse and financial institutions that 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Complaint at 1, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 3229 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 15, 2010). 
 6. Id. at 2. 
 7. Id. at 3. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Consent Judgment at 1, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 3229 
(S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2010), 2010 WL 2779309. 
 10. TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 
MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF RISK RETENTION REQUIREMENTS 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Documents/Section%20946%20Risk%20Retent
ion%20Study%20%20(FINAL).pdf; see generally Susan Block-Lieb & Edward Janger, 
Demand-Side Gatekeepers in the Market for Home Loans, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 465, 465–
70 (2009). 
 11. KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS 
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE AND NEXT STEPS 38 (2011). 
 12. See, e.g., id. at 53–54. 
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over-invested in them were unable to borrow against them in the 
repurchase agreement (“repo”) markets, which led to the insolvency of 
many systemically important financial institutions.13 
As the Financial Crisis demonstrates, when incentives are not 
aligned, securitization can cause significant harm to the economy.14  
Although mortgage related lawsuits have become legion in the wake of 
the Financial Crisis,15 the fact that they may be settled for civil penalties 
without any admission of liability on the part of financial institutions,16 
arguably amounting to a slap-on-the-wrist,17 years after helping to 
precipitate a financial crisis (of which the world has yet to recover), 
underscores the importance of taking prophylactic measures to reform 
the mortgage securitization market. 
Requiring that originators or securitizers keep “skin-in-the-game,” 
and retain an economic interest in the securitization products packaged 
to investors—thereby aligning the interests of investors and 
intermediaries—is the focal point of the regulatory reform of 
securitization in the wake of the Financial Crisis.18  According to U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See, e.g., Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run 
on Repo (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15,223, 2009), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1454939. 
 14. See GEITHNER, supra note 10, at 4. 
 15. See e.g., Consent Order at 4–5, 14–18, United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., No. 12 Civ. 1150 (D.D.C. July 12, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/ 
about/hce/documents/wellsfargosettle.pdf (stipulating that Wells Fargo pay $175 
million to settle complaint alleging discriminatory mortgage lending without admitting 
any liability or wrongdoing pending court approval); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, 
Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Reaches $335 Million Settlement to Resolve 
Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Countrywide Financial Corporation (Dec. 21, 
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-ag-1694.html; 
Jonathan Stempel, U.S. Sues Bank of America over “Hustle” Mortgage Fraud, 
REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2012, 7:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/24/us-
bankofamerica-fraud-lawsuit-idUSBRE89N17120121024 (discussing that United States 
sues Bank of America alleging that it  caused taxpayers more than $1 billion by selling 
toxic mortgage assets to Fannie and Freddie in a scheme known as the “Hustle”). 
 16. See supra notes 4, 9 and accompanying text. 
 17. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., 824 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333–34 (suggesting 
that a $285 million settlement agreement, which, after returning profits collected from 
arranging toxic CDOs, amounts to a $95 million civil penalty, is “pocket change” that 
will do little to deter a “recidivist” entity as large as Citigroup). 
 18. Indeed, Representative Barney Frank considers the risk retention provision of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to be the most 
important portion of the Act, which totals over 2000 pages.  See Nicole Duran, Barney 
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Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, “[r]isk retention can help align 
the interests of the participants in the securitization chain, reduce the 
risks inherent in securitization, and promote the stable formation of 
credit and efficient allocation of capital in the United States.”19 
Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act20 (“Dodd-Frank” or the “Act”) adds a new section 15G to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”) 
that generally requires intermediaries in the securitization chain to retain 
credit risk of the products they distribute to investors.21  Specifically, the 
Act requires securitizers or originators of asset-backed securities 
(“ABS”) to retain not less than 5% of any asset unless that asset is a 
Qualified Residential Mortgage (“QRM”) or meets other safe harbor 
exemptions.22  The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Board”), Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“Commission”), Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(“FHFA”) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(“HUD”) (the OCC, Board, FDIC, Commission, FHFA, and HUD, 
collectively, the “Agencies”) proposed rules to implement the credit risk 
retention requirements of Section 15G of the Exchange Act on April 29, 
2011 (the “Proposed Rules” or “Proposed Risk Retention Rules”) that 
were open for public comment until August 1, 2011.23 
The Agencies’ Proposed Rules prohibit a securitizer from profiting 
from structuring a RMBS or CDO unless investors in the same are paid 
                                                                                                                 
Frank Defends his Law, THE DEAL PIPELINE (July 11, 2011, 5:01 PM), 
http://www.thedeal.com/content/real-estate/frank-defends-his-law.php. 
 19. GEITHNER, supra note 10, at 4. 
 20. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 941, 124 Stat. 1376, 1890–91 (2010). 
 21. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-11 (West 2012). 
 22. Id. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B)(i)(I), (II). 
 23. Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090 (proposed Apr. 29, 2011).  The 
Proposed Rules total 274 pages, and include requests that commentators provide 
feedback on174 questions, some of which contain multiple parts.  As of this date, 
Federal Regulators report that the final QRM rules will not arrive until 2013. Justin T. 
Hilley, Fed Regulators Confirm QRM Won’t Arrive in 2012, HOUSING WIRE (June 6, 
2012, 12:56 PM), http://www.housingwire.com/news/fed-regulators-confirm-qrm-will-
arrive-after-2012.  The rules will take effect, with respect to residential mortgages, one 
year after the final rules are published in the Federal Register and, with respect to all 
other classes of asset backed securities, two years after the final rules are published. See 
15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-11(i). 
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off in full first.24  Additionally, rule makers defined the QRM exemption 
to risk retention narrowly to ensure that originators or securitizers retain 
an economic interest in most mortgage loans—the policy makers 
anticipate that most mortgages would be non-QRM loans.25  Rule 
makers believe that this is the best way to encourage safer underwriting 
standards, boost investor confidence, and restore the private market for 
mortgage securities products.26 
The Proposed Rules have been met with opposition from an 
unlikely combination of financiers, mortgage brokers and consumer 
advocates who believe that the QRM exemption is too narrowly 
defined.27  Generally, these commentators fear that the Proposed Rules 
ultimately will result in denying home ownership to low and middle 
income individuals and minorities.28 Some financial analysts even 
suggest that the Proposed Rules may scare sponsors away from the 
mortgage-backed securities market altogether, thereby further freezing 
the market for private label home loans.29 Other commentators, 
however, question whether risk retention does enough to guard against 
the dangers of securitization that caused the Financial Crisis.30 
Part I of this Comment provides background on problems in the 
mortgage securitization chain that caused the Financial Crisis and what 
Dodd-Frank Act did to correct these flaws through Section 941.  Part II 
examines the proposed credit risk retention rules and the definition of 
the QRM exemption to risk retention promulgated by the Agencies 
pursuant to Dodd-Frank Section 941.  Part III analyzes the market 
impact of the Proposed Rules and public responses to the proposed rules 
from consumer advocates, financiers, and academics.  Part IV makes 
recommendations ahead of final rulemaking.  In particular, Part IV urges 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 25. See Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,118. 
 26. See, e.g., Press Release, FDIC, Chairman Bair’s Statement on Credit Risk 
Retention Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Mar. 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2011/statement03292011.html. 
 27. See, e.g., Joe Adler, Bankers, Consumer Groups Form Rare Alliance to Urge 
Risk Retention Easing, AMERICAN BANKER (May 31, 2011), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_104/bankers-consumers-alliance-risk-
retention-1038197-1.html?zkPrintable=1&nopagination=1. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See, e.g., MARK ZANDI & CRISTIAN DERITIS, MOODY’S ANALYTICS, SPECIAL 
REPORT: REWORKING RISK RETENTION (2011), available at http://www.economy.com/ 
mark-zandi/documents/Reworking-Risk-Retention-062011.pdf. 
 30. See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 
GEO L.J. 1177, 1256–58 (2012). 
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regulators to keep vital provisions of the Proposed Rules alive, including 
the narrow QRM and restrictions on hedging, but suggests a 
modification of the rule regarding the premium capture cash reserve 
account (“Premium Capture Account”) that would allow a securitizer to 
collect fees for arranging a successful securitization transaction more 
readily.  It is hoped that these recommendations will best achieve the 
optimal balance between two goals: on the one hand, keeping 
securitization safe by closely aligning the financial incentives of the 
parties in the securitization chain and on the other, keeping private 
actors interested in arranging securitization transactions at competitive 
rates so that credit will be available to borrowers who are actually able 
to afford homes. 
I. PROBLEMS IN PRE-CRISIS MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION PRACTICE 
& THE DODD-FRANK RESPONSE 
This Part provides a brief overview of the flaws in the mortgage 
securitization process that contributed to the Financial Crisis. This 
explanation is not exhaustive but is meant to provide background to help 
explain why Congress chose skin-in-the-game as a major component of 
mortgage securitization reform. This Part concludes with a discussion of 
the new Section 15G of the Exchange Act that Dodd-Frank creates and 
the rule making authority it vests upon regulatory agencies to enact skin-
in-the-game regulations. 
A. PRE-CRISIS SECURITIZATION: INTERMEDIARIES WIN, BORROWERS AND 
INVESTORS LOSE 
The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs’ 
investigation into the Financial Crisis found that flaws in the 
securitization process were a major contributor to the crisis.31  Loans 
were originated primarily to sell to securitization pools, which meant 
that underwriters bore little, if any, of the default risk of the loans they 
made to consumers.32  Further, “loan originators, warehouse facilitators, 
security designers, credit raters, and marketing and product placement 
professionals all received fees for their part in helping to create and 
                                                                                                                 
 31. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 128 (2010). 
 32. See id. at 43. 
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distribute securities.”33  These fees were paid prior to the sale of the 
security to investors and increased in proportion to the size of the 
securitization.34  Given the capital market demand for such securities, 
the originate-to-distribute model created incentives to originate as many 
mortgage loans as possible to maximize profits from fee collection.35 
Empirical research suggests that the expansion in mortgage credit to 
subprime borrowers was caused by an outward shift in the supply of 
mortgage credit by lenders (i.e., lax lending standards, abuses of 
intermediaries, demand from investors) rather than borrowers 
demonstrating greater income potential.36 
Fee collection, without residual risk, ultimately drove mortgage 
originators to underwrite increasingly risky, and even predatory, 
mortgage loans.37  Mortgage originators made suspect loans, such as 
“liar” loans—where borrowers’ documentation was not reviewed—and 
“ninja” loans—loans made without information on the borrower’s 
income, job, or assets.38  Further, mortgage brokers were rewarded with 
yield spread premiums and additional fees for steering borrowers 
towards costlier subprime loans.39  Originators then sold these loans to 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Securitization of Assets: Problems and Solutions: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance and Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., 
and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 70 (2009) (testimony of Dr. William W. Irving, 
Portfolio Manager, Fidelity Investments). 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: 
Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis, 124 Q. J. ECON. 1449, 1477–83 
(2009), available at http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/124/4/1449.full.pdf+html. 
 37. Increased competition among mortgage originators has been linked to the 
erosion of underwriting standards that caused the Financial Crisis.  Specifically, 
mortgage originators competed with one another for market share, which led to a race 
to the bottom in underwriting standards in order to originate as many loans as possible. 
See Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88 IND. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1924831 (arguing that mortgage lending was safer when competition was weaker 
and securitizers, rather than originators, monitored underwriting standards). Accord 
David Line Batty, Dodd-Frank’s Requirement of “Skin In the Game” for Asset-Backed 
Securities May Scalp Corporate Loan Liquidity, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 13, 39 (2011) 
(suggesting that the incredible demand for securities products encouraged very risky 
lending decisions). 
 38. See Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities 
Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1359, 1397 (2009). 
 39. See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 11, at 21–32. 
414 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
securitizers, who in turn packaged them to investors all over the world, 
paying little, if any, attention to the quality of the loans they were 
distributing.40 
Without being forced to keep skin-in-the-game, securitizers, 
looking to satisfy virtually insatiable demand for AAA debt41 and 
believing that diversification alone would lessen portfolio risk of such 
debt,42 made increasingly complex re-securitization products, such as 
CDOs, CDO-squared, and CDO-cubed, which enabled them to pass any 
risk they retained in an ABS to investors.43  ABS products are broken up 
into tranches, and tranches are paid sequentially from the most senior 
tranche to the most subordinate tranche.44  Prior to the Financial Crisis, 
more senior tranches would receive the highest rating from ratings 
agencies whereas mezzanine or subordinate tranches generally received 
below investment-grade ratings.45  In practice, securitizers ended up 
retaining a stake in the more subordinated tranches with below 
investment-grade ratings because of lack of investor demand for these 
“riskier” products.46  This did not incentivize securitizers to monitor 
loan quality, however.  Instead, to avoid retaining exposure to poorly 
rated subordinated tranches, securitizers would re-securitize the below 
investment grade tranches into new products, such as CDOs.47   The 
CDOs would also pay out sequentially from the most senior to the most 
subordinate tranche and receive corresponding credit ratings even 
though the assets underlying the CDO may have been from below 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See id. 
 41. See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 13, at 9 (“[E]ssentially, there is not enough 
AAA debt in the world to satisfy demand, so the banking system has set out to 
manufacture the supply.”). 
 42. See Mendales, supra note 38, at 1389 (arguing that the CDO bust demonstrated 
that thousands of bad asset-backed securities pooled together are as toxic as any of 
them individually). 
 43. See e.g., Gorton & Metrick, supra note 13, at 9–10 (explaining that each level 
of securitization brought an additional level of opacity with regard to what exactly was 
behind each tranche). 
 44. See, e.g., Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 10, at 471–72. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 13, at 10–11. Institutional investors, such as 
pension funds or mutual funds, are often only allowed to invest in investment grade 
securities or higher (typically A or higher).  See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 10, at 
471. 
 47. See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 11, at 51–52. 
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investment grade tranches in the initial ABS.48  This allowed securitizers 
to parcel out the risk they retained in the riskiest tranches of an ABS to 
investors in the form of investment grade securities.49  If securitizers 
were again forced to retain exposure on the more poorly rated CDO 
tranches, the process was repeated to make CDO-squares, and, in turn, 
repeated again to make CDO-cubes.50 
The complexities of re-securitizations made it very difficult for 
investors to understand the quality of the assets they were purchasing.51  
Without originators or securitizers monitoring loan quality, they were 
reliant on credit ratings agencies to reveal the quality of the assets 
underlying the securitization products they purchased.52  The ratings 
agencies were unable to fulfill this gate-keeping role.53  Ratings 
agencies, like the securitizers themselves, had no required exposure to 
the products they rated and received fees from securitizers for rating 
products.54  Contrary to their better judgment, credit ratings agencies 
gave risky ABS and risky re-securitization products that they knew were 
prone to high default rates investment grade ratings in order to generate 
future business from securitizers.55  Whereas corporate debt rated Baa 
(the lowest investment grade rating) defaulted at a rate of 2.2% from 
1983 to 2005, CDOs with the same credit rating defaulted at a rate of 
24% from 1993 to 2005.56  Such a differential in default rates between 
bonds of the same credit rating suggests that the pre-crisis securitization 
market could not regulate itself properly when the parties best able to 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See id. at 52–53. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. This is not to say that securitizers were per se setting up investors to 
fail. They believed that diversification, rather than monitoring the borrower’s ability to 
repay, would protect investors from suffering systematic losses. This turned out to be 
false when all of the mortgages underlying these products were of poor quality. See 
Mendales, supra note 38, at 1389 (arguing that Criimi Mae’s collapse after investing 
primarily in junior tranches of CDOs exemplifies that there is a limit to the extent to 
which diversification can make securitized products safe). 
 51. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 128 (2010); see also GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY 
THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 (2010) (emphasizing how difficult it is to 
pierce the veil of a CDO and learn exactly what lies beneath each tranche). 
 52. See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 10, at 472–75. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 11, at 51–56. 
 56. See Mendales, supra note 38 at 1396. 
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monitor the underwriting quality of securitization products did not keep 
skin-in-the-game.57 
B. SECURITIZATION’S VOLATILE EFFECTS, OVERLEVERAGING AND 
IRRATIONAL ACTORS 
The Financial Crisis demonstrated that if securitization is left 
unregulated, banks are susceptible to collapse because markets are 
unable to fully internalize the risks securitization can pose to financial 
and economic activity.58  The Financial Crisis showed us that a localized 
real estate bust can threaten the solvency of the banking system due in 
part to financial interdependence and irrational actors.59  Some financial 
economists argue that although the creation of safe securities is 
desirable, securitization and other financial engineering (dubbed in 
academic literature as “financial innovation”) expose the financial 
system to crisis.60  A recent model of the Financial Crisis suggests that 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Accord Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 10, at 472-73 (arguing that the RMBS 
market collapsed because the mortgage lending model shifted from an investment 
model to a sales model and credit rating agencies failed to value mortgage pools 
properly). 
 58. See GEITHNER, supra note 10, at 14 (“Taken as a whole, these problems 
illustrate that markets are unable, in certain circumstances, to align the incentives of 
parties in the securitization chain adequately. Moreover markets may not fully 
internalize the risks securitization can pose to financial and economic stability. Such 
weaknesses demonstrate the need for regulatory reforms.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 10, at 478-79 (discussing the 
cognitive limitations of consumer borrowers to make sound borrowing decisions as it 
relates to purchasing a home); Nicola Gennaioli et al., Neglected Risks, Financial 
Innovation, and Financial Fragility 29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No.16068, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16068 (explaining 
that sophisticated institutions also may irrationally over-invest in a securities product).  
I do not endeavor to provide the full behavioral finance explanation in this space but a 
cursory discussion of a few root causes is warranted to put securitization reform into 
perspective. 
 60. See, e.g., Gennaioli et al., supra note 59, at 39; Josh Lerner & Peter Tufano, 
The Consequences of Financial Innovation: A Counterfactual Research Agenda 5–10 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16780, 2011), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16780.pdf (explaining the pros and cons of financial 
innovation); Jeremy Stein, Monetary Policy as Financial-Stability Regulation, (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16883, 2011), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16883 (“This paper . . . defines the fundamental market 
failure to be addressed, namely that unregulated private money creation can lead to an 
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the creation of new and complex securities products (such as CDOs and 
CDSs) to satisfy investor demand creates a boom and bust tendency 
because investors, even sophisticated ones like financial institutions, are 
irrational,61 tending to be initially overly optimistic about the investment 
prospects of new securities products.62  This over-optimism manifests 
itself in both excessive origination of the underlying asset,63 as well as 
excessive willingness of financial institutions to borrow and lend against 
the securitized assets on a short-term basis.64  Once certain “neglected 
risks” of these products are realized, the market’s view towards them 
turns sharply: investors seek to dump these products, new issuance stops 
and the willingness to lend against these securities products as collateral 
(i.e., repo financing) deteriorates.65 
This behavioral model of over-optimism followed by sharp 
pessimism helps to explain how subprime mortgage securitization 
precipitated the Financial Crisis.  When subprime lending was at its 
peak, it “helped accelerate price increases in the housing market to 
unsustainable levels and, therefore, contributed to the ensuing decline in 
housing prices and the economy.”66  A problematic feedback loop 
developed where increases in home prices encouraged greater lending 
and increases in lending precipitated further increases in home prices.67  
Increases in housing prices led to further investment in mortgage 
securities products and large financial institutions started to increasingly 
use these products to collateralize short-term borrowings (i.e., as 
collateral for repo agreements).68  Trillions of dollars worth of subprime 
                                                                                                                 
externality in which intermediaries issue too much short-term debt and leave the system 
excessively vulnerable to costly financial crises”). 
 61. The use of the term irrational investor in this context is meant as short-hand for 
the theory of “local thinking,” which describes a scenario where an investor makes 
investment decisions based on a subset of possible outcomes rather than taking into 
account all of the information the market has to offer, as the efficient market hypothesis 
assumes. See Gennaioli et al., supra note 59, at 5. 
 62. See id; see generally Lerner & Tufano, supra note 60. 
 63. This over-origination is the product of both irrational investment decisions on 
the part of consumers and the failures of “demand-side gate keepers” to monitor loan 
quality. See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 10, at 475–83. 
 64. Gennaioli et al., supra note 59, at 2–3. 
 65. Id. at 3. 
 66. See GEITHNER, supra note 10, at 12 (citing Mian & Sufi, supra note 36, at 
1477–83). 
 67. See id. 
 68. See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 13, at 1–2, 10–11.  Prior to the crisis, 
investment banks, especially Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and 
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securities products were created.69 Later, when home prices began to 
decline and subprime mortgages began to default, investors sought to 
dump mortgage securities products en masse and the value of these 
securities products plummeted.70 For banks that over-invested in these 
products or over-leveraged them, a “bank-run” ensued, whereby 
investors refused to finance banks’ short term debt by purchasing repo 
agreements,71 including repos that were collateralized by safer securities, 
such as commercial paper.72  The inability of financial institutions to 
finance their short-term debt through the repo market was a death 
sentence for Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers,73 and necessitated a 
government bailout for other Wall Street players through TARP.  
Further, demand for all securities products screeched to a halt, 
constricting the general flow of credit available to consumer 
borrowers.74 
Left unregulated, securitization can be incredibly volatile. Although 
subprime defaults were fairly localized in the United States, the local 
                                                                                                                 
Bear Sterns, and even commercial banks, such as Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, and Bank of 
America, relied heavily on the “repo” market for their short-term liquidity needs.  A 
repo agreement is a two-part transaction that is primarily between a bank and an 
institutional investor.  In the first step, a bank or borrower transfers securities, in 
exchange for cash, to a depositor or lender.  The second step includes a 
contemporaneous agreement by the bank to repurchase the securities at a premium on a 
specified future date. The repo market collateralizes banks’ short-term borrowing with 
securities products and acts as a safe, deposit-like investment, for institutional investors 
or other entities. See id. at 10. 
 69. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 11, at 38 and accompanying text. 
 70. See Gennaioli et al., supra note 59, at 2–3, 38. 
 71. See id. at 37–38. 
 72. See id.; see also Daniel M. Covitz, Nellie Liang, & Gustavo A. Suarez, The 
Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Panic in the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market, 
(Divs. of Res. & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 
2009-36, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200936/ 
200936pap.pdf (arguing that panic over the solvency of banking institutions led to 
contraction of demand for asset backed commercial paper securities, severely crippling 
banks’ ability to finance short-term debt). 
 73. See, e.g., Gorton & Metric, supra note 13, at 1–2, 4, 10–11. 
 74. See GEITHNER, supra note 10, at 13 (noting that during the financial crisis the 
prices of other ABS, such as those backed by auto loans, credit cards, student loans, 
loans to businesses, and loans secured by heavy equipment, all fell dramatically and 
simultaneously). 
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default crises were parceled to investors all over the world. 75  At the 
time the government took over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which had 
taken a severe beating by guaranteeing subprime loans, the two 
government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) held half of the United 
States’ $12 trillion residential mortgages.76  Moreover, investors all over 
the globe, including foreign governments, held over $ 5.4 trillion in debt 
securities backed by the GSEs.77  Clearly, securitization had serious 
global macroeconomic consequences. 
C. THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE 
Financiers, mortgage brokers, irrational actors and the inherent 
volatility of securitization in well-integrated markets are not the only 
causes of the Financial Crisis.  The government’s desire to push for the 
American (Pipe) Dream of homeownership also fueled the Financial 
Crisis.78  The HUD affordable housing initiative under the Federal 
Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act79 incentivized 
both government sponsored institutions, namely Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, and private lending institutions to increase home 
ownership.80  The easiest way of reaching HUD’s goals, especially 
among distressed communities, was to relax lending standards.81  As a 
result, the use of “innovative lending standards to allow for the 
acceptances of loans of more than 97% [loan to value ratio (“LTV”)], of 
loans to those with impaired credit, high debt [to income] ratios, and 
questionable income potential” became more prevalent.82  The Bush 
Administration went so far as to embrace subprime loans as the key to 
growth in homeownership, especially for minority Americans.83  The 
initial consequence of the government’s desire to increase affordable 
housing was the lowering of underwriting standards of commercial 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See Mendales, supra note 38, at 1359; see also Mian & Sufi, supra note 36, at 
1 (noting that subprime defaults were concentrated to a handful of zip codes). 
 76. See Dale A. Oesterle, The Collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Victims 
or Villains?, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 733, 733 (2010). 
 77. See id. at 734. 
 78. See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 11, at 20–21; Oesterle, supra note 76, 
at 749–52. 
 79. 12 U.S.C. § 4501 (2006). 
 80. See Oesterle, supra note 76, at 749–52. 
 81. Id. at 750. 
 82. Id. 
 83. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 11, at 21. 
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mortgages to meet affordable housing goals.84  However, the 
government’s encouragement of lower underwriting standards 
eventually extended to all types of home loans.85  Consequently, well-off 
borrowers and real estate speculators were able to take out risky high 
leveraged loans for second homes, retirement homes and vacation 
homes.86  In the end, the originate-to-distribute model of lending, 
supported by the government’s desire to increase home ownership, 
deteriorated underwriting standards for all home loans, and contributed 
to the Financial Crisis.87  The government eventually stepped in and 
took over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the private label mortgage-
backed securities market has yet to recover. 88 
D. WHAT DODD-FRANK DID; SECTION 941 
Through Dodd-Frank, Congress added a new Section 15G to the 
Exchange Act to correct the flaws in the securitization process discussed 
above, namely by reforming the originate to distribute model of 
securitization so as to align the economic interests of investors and 
intermediaries in the securitization chain. 89  Congress felt that credit risk 
retention would encourage securitizers to monitor carefully the loans 
they purchase from originators which, in turn, would, at the very least, 
create disincentives to risky and predatory lending.90  In addition, the 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See Oesterele, supra note 76, at 749–52. 
 85. “Had the banks and Fannie and Freddie limited the loosening of their 
underwriting standards to CRA loans, the mortgage crisis would not have been a crisis. 
However the lowered underwriting standards infected all underwriting standards.”  Id. 
at 751 (citing Edward Pinto, How Did Paul Krugman Get it So Wrong? (Nov. 9, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/22327819/Pinto- 
How-Did-Paul-Krugman-Get-It-So-Wrong-11-9-09. See also  Brent J. Horton, In 
Defense of Private-Label Mortgage-Backed Securities, 61 FLA. L. REV. 827, 881–82 
(2009) (arguing that congressional initiatives to expand home ownership are at fault for 
precipitating the Financial Crisis). 
 86. See id. 
 87. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 11, at 21. 
 88. Press Release, FDIC, supra note 26, at 3 (“[T]he private securitization market, 
which created more than $1 trillion in mortgage credit annually in its peak years of 
2005 and 2006, has virtually ceased to exist in the wake of the crisis.  Issuance in 2009 
and 2010 was just 5% of peak levels.”). 
 89. Id. at 1 (“Fundamentally, [Section 15G] is about reforming the ‘originate-to-
distribute’ model for securitization, and realigning the interests in structured finance 
towards long-term, sustainable lending.”). See also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 129 (2010). 
 90. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 128. 
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limited empirical research available91 suggests that RMBS products are 
less likely to suffer losses when the economic interests of the parties in 
the securitization chain are aligned.92 
As it pertains to residential mortgage securitization, Section 15G 
generally requires securitizers93 to retain not less than 5% of any ABS 
unless all of the assets that comprise the securitization pool are qualified 
residential mortgages (QRMs)—that is, even if every mortgage but one 
in a securitization pool is a QRM, a sponsor would be required to retain 
at least 5% of an economic interest in the pool.94  In particular, the 
legislation specifically prohibits a securitizer or its affiliates from 
directly or indirectly hedging against its required exposure to the 
products it securitizes, thereby keeping the interests between investor 
and intermediary closely aligned.95  The legislation specifically requires 
regulators to specify permissible forms of risk retention,96 define the 
                                                                                                                 
 91. See GEITHNER, supra note 10, at 17. 
 92. See Cem Demiroglu & Christopher James, How Important is Having Skin in 
the Game? Originator-Sponsor Affiliation and Losses on Mortgage-backed Securities, 
25 REV. FIN. STUD. 3217 (2012), available at http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/ 
2012/09/10/rfs.hhs095.full.pdf (showing that default rates on securitized mortgages 
were lower when originators and securitizers were affiliated entities because an 
originator was less likely to sell poor quality assets to its own affiliate). 
 93. The legislation defines a “securitizer” as “(A) an issuer of an asset-backed 
security; or (B) a person who organizes and initiates an asset-backed securities 
transaction by selling or transferring assets, either directly or indirectly, including 
through an affiliate to the issuer.” 15 U.S.C.A. 78o-11(a)(3) (West 2012). 
 94. See id. § 78o-11(c)(1). Section 15G states that the Agencies must permit 
securitizers to retain less than 5% of the risk of commercial mortgages, commercial 
loans, and auto-loans if those loans meet underwriting standards that indicate that they 
are of low credit risk. Id. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B)(ii), (c)(2)(B). In addition, 15G creates an 
exemption for loans to farming entities, loans backed by the federal government, and 
loans backed by state governments. Id. § 78o-11(c)(G)(iii).  The Agencies’ also have 
the authority to issue other exemptions, exceptions or adjustments for other classes of 
institutions or assets as appropriate. Id. § 78o-11 (e)(1). Enforcement authority under 
the statute (and related regulations) rests with the appropriate Federal banking regulator 
(e.g., the Board, OCC, FDIC) if the securitizer is an insured depository institution and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission if the securitizer is not an insured depository 
institution. Id. § 78o-11 (f). 
 95. Id. § 78o-11(c)(1)(A). 
 96. Id. § 78o-11(c)(1)(C)(i).  Cognizant of the fact that different forms of risk 
retention may be warranted for different asset classes, Dodd-Frank gives the regulatory 
agencies flexibility in determining the scope and nature of how securitizers are to retain 
credit risk. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 130 (2010).  Section 15G authorizes regulators to 
craft risk retention rules and exemptions specifically tailored for asset classes other than 
residential mortgages, such as commercial mortgages, commercial loans, auto loans and 
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QRM, create a total or partial exemption for federally-issued or 
guaranteed ABS, create a total or partial exemption for state-issued or 
guaranteed ABS, and allow for the allocation of required risk retention 
to be split between a securitizer and originator.97  In addition, the 
legislation gives regulators leeway to craft other safe harbor exemptions 
if appropriate for the protection of investors.98 
Although Section 15G delegates defining the QRM to regulators, it 
is important to note that the ultimate definition of the QRM may be no 
broader than the definition of the Qualified Mortgage (“QM”), as 
defined in Title 14 of the Dodd-Frank Act.99  Title 14 of the Act amends 
the Truth in Lending Act to empower the Board to set mortgage 
originating standards that would generally prohibit a lender from 
extending mortgage credit to a borrower unless the borrower 
demonstrates the ability to repay the loan.100  Sections 1411 and 1412 of 
the Act generally require creditors to make a reasonable determination 
of a consumer’s ability to repay a residential mortgage loan as well as 
establish certain protections from liability under this requirement for 
                                                                                                                 
any other asset class that the Board, OCC, FDIC and the SEC deem appropriate. See § 
78o-11(c)(2)(A).  Some scholars argue that skin-in-the-game would not necessarily 
encourage safer underwriting standards for classes of asset-backed securities other than 
residential mortgages. See generally Batty, supra note 37 (arguing that skin-in-the-
game would not necessarily make the market for collateralized loan obligations any 
safer); Joseph Philip Forte, Risk Retention in CMBS Lending—Reality or Illusion, 
SS047 ALI-ABA 1255, 1259 (2011) (arguing that risk retention by a securitizer is 
unnecessary in the market for commercial real estate loans because a third party 
purchaser of subordinate tranches adequately serves to monitor the loans underlying the 
CMBS); Adam J. Levitin, Skin-In-The-Game: Risk Retention Lessons From Credit 
Card Securitization (Georgetown University Law Center, Business, Economics and 
Regulatory Policy Working Paper Series Research Paper No. 11-18, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1898763 (arguing that risk retention 
plays a questionable role at best in incentivizing better underwriting quality in the 
market for credit card ABS because the market, in effect, polices itself through implicit 
recourse). 
 97. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-11(c)(1)(G)(ii) (West 2012). 
 98. See id. § 78o-11 (c)(1)(B)(ii), (c)(2)(B). 
 99. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 1412, 124 Stat. 1376, 2145 (2010). 
 100. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1639c(a), (b)(1) (West 2012).  This section of the Truth in 
Lending Act was added pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1411, 124 Stat. 1376, 2142 (2010). 
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home loans that constitute “qualified mortgages.”101  The Qualified 
Mortgage (“QM”) is not to be confused with the Qualified Residential 
Mortgage, the proposed rules for which are discussed at length in this 
Comment.  The QM—the final rules of which were recently adopted—is 
the exemption that insulates a lender from liability for failing to comply 
with the ability to pay provisions under Dodd-Frank and regulations 
promulgated there-under by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”).102  In contrast, the QRM is the exemption that allows 
sponsors to avoid retaining risk in a securitization transaction where the 
underlying assets in the pool are residential mortgages.103  Although full 
discussion of the QM rules is beyond the scope of this Comment, at a 
minimum, a QM may not provide for (i) negative amortization, (ii) a 
balloon payment that is twice the average of earlier payments, (iii) total 
points and fees of more than 3% of the loan amount, and (iv) a mortgage 
term of more than thirty years.104  Additionally, in the case of an 
adjustable rate mortgage, the underwriting for a QM must be based on 
the maximum rate for the loan during the first five years and a payment 
schedule that fully amortizes the loan over the loan term.105  Because a 
QRM may not be defined more broadly than a QM, the QRM must, at a 
minimum, meet the above requirements.106  The statutory language 
seems to imply that the QRM is supposed to be more narrowly defined 
than the QM.  It is also interesting to note that the QM (unlike the 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Id. § 1639c(b)(2); see also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Press 
Release, “Ability to Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in 
Lending Act” (Regulation Z), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
regulations/ability-to-repay-and-qualified-mortgage-standards-under-the-truth-in-
lending-act-regulation-z/#doccontents.  
 102. The final QM rules issued by the CFPB create two separate qualified mortgage 
safe harbors based on the credit risk of a mortgage loan.  The lenders who make loans 
that conform with the safer of the two standards are insulated from liability entirely for 
making a good faith determination of a borrower’s ability to repay a loan, whereas 
lenders who make loans that conform to the riskier QM are afforded a rebuttable 
presumption of compliance with the ability to-repay provisions. See Ability-to-Repay 
and Qualified Mortgage Standards under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 
Fed. Reg. 6407, 6586–87 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 1026.43(e)). 
 103. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-11(c)(1). 
 104. See id. § 1639c(b)(2)(A).  There is an exemption for extending the mortgage 
term past thirty years in high cost areas. See § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(vii).  Dodd Frank gives 
the Board the authority to treat a reverse mortgage as a QM and have the borrower’s 
debt-to-income ratio factor into the QM. See § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(vi), (ix). 
 105. Id. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(v). 
 106. Id. § 1639c(b)(2)(A). 
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proposed QRM)107 has no requirement of a down payment on the part of 
the borrower.108  
 
Table 1: Summary of 15 U.S.C. 78o-11 For 
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities 
 
Risk retention: 
What is set by statute  
 Securitizer must retain 5% of the credit risk of an 
ABS unless all of the mortgages collateralizing a 
securitization pool are QRMs. 
 Issuer, Sponsor, or Depositor (as applicable) may 
not directly or indirectly (i.e., an entity affiliated 
with the issuer, sponsor or depositor may not) hedge 
against its 5% required interest in an ABS by 
purchasing CDS or insurance contracts. 
 QRM must fit within the definition of the QM as 
defined under Title 14 of Dodd-Frank (which 
amends the Truth In Lending Act). 
 No reverse mortgages or interest only payments. 
 For adjustable rate mortgages, interest rate may not 
increase by more than 2% in any twelve-month 
period or by 6% over the life of the transaction. 
 Total or partial exemption for ABS backed by state 
or federal government. 
What is left up to 
regulators to decide 
 The form risk retention takes (i.e., how does a 
securitizer retain a 5% stake in an ABS). 
 The narrowness of the definition of QRM (but no 
broader than the definition of QM). 
 The minimum duration of Risk Retention. 
 Must establish appropriate standard of risk retention 
for re-securitization products. 




                                                                                                                 
 107. See infra Part II.B.6. 
 108. Clea Benson, Housing Industry Awaits Down-Payment Rule for Mortgages, 
BLOOMBERG, (Jan. 18, 2013, 12:01 AM) (noting that the QM fell short of requiring a 
down payment requirement), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-
18/housing-industry-awaits-down-payment-rule-for-mortgages.html. 
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II. THE PROPOSED RMBS RISK RETENTION RULES AND QRM SAFE-
HARBOR 
On April 21, 2011, the Agencies released proposed rules on credit 
risk retention, as required by Section 15G.109  This section provides an 
overview of the risk retention rules, highlights a few important rules that 
will change economic incentives of sponsors in a securitization 
transaction, and breaks down the Agencies’ proposed definition of the 
QRM safe-harbor. 
A. RISK RETENTION RULES 
Though Dodd-Frank gave the Agencies the authority to require a 
higher level of risk retention, the Proposed Rules require that a 
securitizer retain not less than 5% of an interest in an ABS for its entire 
duration unless certain exemptions are met.  The details of three 
particular parts of the Proposed Rules that apply to the securitization of 
all asset classes are fundamental to understanding how the securitization 
market will change: (1) how risk is to be retained, (2) the establishment 
of a Premium Capture Account, and (3) prohibitions on hedging. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090 (proposed Apr. 29, 2011).  In 
considering how to determine whether a mortgage is of sufficient credit quality to 
constitute a QRM, the Agencies looked at a mortgage performance dataset that 
consisted of underwriting and performance information on approximately 8.9 million 
mortgages. Id. at 24,117–18.  In addition, the Agencies looked to another dataset that 
consisted of more than 75 million mortgages that were packaged into ABS. As per the 
above-described legislation, the Proposed Rules require that sponsors or originators of 
asset backed securities retain a 5% position in the ABS unless the loans underlying the 
securitization meet prescribed safe harbors.  Importantly, the Proposed Rules do not 
allow a sponsor to hedge directly or indirectly its interest in the securitization it 
arranges.  This would prevent a sponsor’s affiliated entity from purchasing a credit 
default swap or other insurance contract that would have the net effect of negating the 
risk retained in the securitization of the sponsor.  Consistent with the intent of skin-in-
the-game regulatory reform, the prohibition on a sponsor hedging its skin (i.e., 
purchasing credit default swaps) ensures that a sponsor’s incentive to monitor loan 
quality is not offset by insurance. See id. at 24,117. 
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1. How Risk May Be Retained 
The Proposed Rules provide a menu of options by which 
securitizers may structure their risk retention for a given asset class.110  
As it pertains to RMBS transactions, this includes more obvious 
methods, such as horizontal retention (holding the lowest tranche in an 
ABS in the amount equal to 5% of the entire ABS), vertical retention 
(retaining not less than 5% of each tranche in an ABS), L-shaped 
retention (a combination of horizontal and vertical: holding 2.5% of 
each tranche in an ABS and holding a portion of the lowest tranche in an 
ABS equal to 2.564%), and retention by holding a representative sample 
(holding a random sample of unsecuritized loans that were picked for 
securitization).111  A sponsor using these methods must disclose to 
investors how it is retaining credit risk as well as the material 
assumptions and methodologies used in determining the aggregate dollar 
amount of the ABS interests issued to investors in the securitization 
transactions.112  Based on custom and practice in the securitization 
industry, the Proposed Rules also include retention structures suited for 
particular asset classes, such as revolving lines of credit, asset-backed 
commercial paper, and commercial mortgage-backed securities.113 
2. Premium Capture Cash Reserve Account 
The Proposed Rules require a securitizer to keep any profits 
collected for arranging a securitization transaction in a Premium Capture 
Account.114  The Premium Capture Account is a trust account that serves 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See S. REP. NO. 111-76, at 130 (2010). 
 111. See Credit Risk Retention, §§___.3, ___.6, ___.8, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090, 
24,158–59 (proposed Apr. 29, 2011). 
 112. See id. §§ ___.4(b), ___.5(c), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,158–59. 
 113. See id. §§___.7, ___.9 –___.10, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,159–62.  The rule also 
allows for risk retention to be split between originator and securitizer, as an additional 
means of giving intermediaries flexibility in structuring risk retention. Id. §___.13, 76 
Fed. Reg. at 24,163.  There are safe harbor exemptions in the Proposed Rules for 
commercial mortgages, commercial loans, and auto-loans. See id. §§___.16 – ___.20, 
76 Fed. Reg. at 24,167–72.  Although rule makers had the authority to adopt safe harbor 
exemptions for other classes of ABS, such as revolving lines of credit, no such 
exemptions were adopted. See id. §___.7. 
 114. See id. §___.12(a), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,162. The plain language of the Proposed 
Rules does not appear to allow a sponsor to be compensated outside of the premium 
capture cash reserve account as the amount by which the gross proceeds received by a 
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as a first loss position in an ABS.115  Meaning, before any losses in an 
ABS may be realized, funds from the account shall be released to satisfy 
payments on ABS interests on any date on which there are insufficient 
funds to satisfy an amount due on an ABS.116  Put differently, any profits 
a securitizer earns for arranging a securitization transaction are held in 
trust to satisfy its payment obligations to investors and may not be 
collected by the securitizer unless investors in the ABS are paid in 
full.117  Furthermore, the amounts in the trust account may only be 
invested in one-year U.S. Treasuries or in one or more depository 
institutions that are fully insured by the FDIC.118  The Premium Capture 
Account must be established regardless of whether or not an ABS is 
exempt from risk retention. 
3. Prohibitions on Hedging 
The Proposed Rules prohibit securitizers and their affiliates from 
directly or indirectly hedging against their required exposure to the 
products they securitize, thereby keeping the interests between investor 
and intermediary closely aligned, with a few exceptions.119  Securitizers 
may still hedge against interest rate risk, and foreign exchange risk.120  
Importantly however, securitizers cannot simply bet against a 
securitization pool entirely so that their interests are adverse to that of 
investors in the ABS, as seen in the years leading up to the Financial 
Crisis.121 
                                                                                                                 
sponsor, net of costs paid out by the sponsor to unaffiliated parties, exceeds the par 
value of all interests in an ABS must be held in the premium capture cash reserve 
account. See id.  
 115. See id. §___.12(b)(1), (3), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,162. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. §___.12(b)(3), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,162. 
 118. See id. §___.12(b)(2), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,162. 
 119. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,116 (“The proposal prohibits a sponsor and its 
consolidated affiliates from purchasing or selling a security or other financial 
instrument, or entering into an agreement (including an insurance contract) . . . [that] in 
any way reduces or limits the financial exposure of the sponsor to the credit risk of one 
or more of the particular ABS interests.”).  This rule specifically inhibits issuers from 
using credit default swaps to limit exposure to any retained interest they may have in an 
RMBS. 
 120. See Credit Risk Retention, §___.14(d)(1), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,163. 
 121. See id. §___.14, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,163; see also supra notes 1–9 and 
accompanying text. 
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B. THE QUALIFIED RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE 
For a securitizer to be exempt from retaining risk in an RMBS, all 
of the mortgages that collateralize the ABS must be QRMs at the closing 
of the securitization transaction and each of the QRMs collateralizing 
the ABS must be currently performing—that is, the borrower must not 
be more than 30 days past due in whole or in part on the mortgage.122  In 
addition, the depositor123 or sponsor124 of the ABS (as applicable) must 
certify that it evaluated the effectiveness of its internal supervisory 
controls for ensuring that all of the assets that collateralize the ABS are 
QRMs (as defined below).125  Finally, the sponsor must provide a copy 
of the certification described above to potential investors before the sale 
of the ABS and, upon request, to the Commission and the appropriate 
Federal banking regulator as applicable.126  Below is a tabular summary 
of how the Agencies defined the QRM in the Proposed Rules followed 






                                                                                                                 
 122. See Credit Risk Retention, §___.15(b)(1)–(3), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,165.  The 
Proposed Rules also include an appendix, which details standards for determining 
acceptable sources for a borrower’s down payment and standards for verifying a 
borrower’s income.  See id. at 24,173–86.  Discussion of the specifics of the appendix is 
not included here, as the standards themselves have not been singled out for 
controversy.  
 123. The term “depositor” has three meanings.  “Depositor means the person that 
receives or purchases and transfers or sells the securitized assets to the issuing entity.”  
Credit Risk Retention, §___.2, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,156.  “[I]n the case of a securitization 
transaction, where there is not an intermediate transfer of the assets from the sponsor to 
the issuing entity,” depositor means sponsor. Id.  Depositor also means “[t]he person 
that receives or purchases and transfers or sells the securitized assets to the issuing 
entity in the case of a securitization transaction where the person transferring or selling 
the securitized assets directly to the issuing entity is itself a trust.” Id. 
 124. The Proposed Rules define a “sponsor” as “a person who organizes and 
initiates a securitization transaction by selling or transferring assets, either directly or 
indirectly, including through an affiliate, to the issuing entity.” Id. §___.2, 76 Fed. Reg. 
at 24,157. 
 125. See id. §___.15(b)(4)(i)–(iii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,165–66. 
 126. See id. §___.15(b)(4)(iii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,165–66. 
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Table 2: Proposed QRM 
 
Underwriting Criteria  Closed-end first-lien mortgage to purchase or 
refinance a one-to-four family property at least one 
unit of which is a dwelling of a family. 
 A QRM cannot be a construction loan, reverse 
mortgage, bridge loan or timeshare. 
Credit History  Borrower must not be 60 days or more past due on 
any debt obligation in past 24 months. 
 Borrower must not have been a debtor in 
bankruptcy within the last three years. 
Ability to Repay  A QRM must fit within the definition of the QM as 
defined under Title 14 of Dodd-Frank (which 
amends the Truth In Lending Act). 
 No reverse mortgages or interest only payments. 
 For adjustable rate mortgages, the interest rate may 
not increase by more than 2% in any twelve month 
period or by 6% over the life of the transaction. 
Loan to Value Ratio  80% in a purchase transaction, 75% in a refinancing 
and 70% in cash out refinancing. 
Servicing/Default 
Mitigation 
 Provides financial incentives for servicers to 





 The Proposed Rules seek to balance the interest of 
encouraging sponsors to review the loans 
collateralizing an ABS transaction against the 
interest of not detering sponsors from issuing ABS 
altogether. Accordingly, a sponsor would not lose 
the protection of the QRM safe harbor provision if 
they were to follow the internal review procedures 
required by the Proposed Rules and take additional 
measures to remediate any errors. 
 
1. Underwriting Criteria for QRM 
The Proposed Rules limit a QRM to a closed-end first lien 
mortgage to purchase or refinance a one-to-four family property, at least 
one unit of which is the principal dwelling of a borrower.127  A QRM 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id. §___.15(c)–(d)(1), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166. 
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may not be a (i) loan to finance the initial construction of a property, (ii) 
a reverse mortgage, (iii) a bridge loan with a term of twelve months or 
less, or a (iv) time share.128 
2. Credit History 
To qualify as a QRM, a creditor must verify and document that 
within 90 days prior to the closing of the mortgage, the borrower is not 
30 days or more past due, in whole or in part, on the mortgage, and is 
not 60 or more days past due, in whole or in part, on any debt obligation 
within the preceding 24 months.129  Further, within the preceding 36 
months, a borrower must not have been a debtor in a bankruptcy 
proceeding, had property repossessed or foreclosed upon, engaged in a 
short sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, or been subject to a federal or 
state judgment for collection of any unpaid debt.130  The creditor may 
satisfy these underwriting criteria by obtaining at least two credit reports 
from consumer reporting agencies that compile and maintain files on 
consumers on a nationwide basis, indicating that the borrower meets all 
the requisite underwriting criteria.131 
3. Payment Terms and Assumability 
Consistent with the requirements for a qualified mortgage under 
section 1639(b)(2) of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), the Proposed 
Rules seek to discourage loan terms that were associated with predatory 
lending in the years leading up to the crisis.132  The Proposed Rules 
exclude QRMs from having payment terms that allow interest-only 
payments or negative amortization.133  In addition, the Proposed Rules 
prohibit balloon payments, “defined . . . as a scheduled payment of 
principal and interest that is more than twice as large as any earlier 
scheduled payment of principal and interest.”134  To protect against the 
adverse impact of interest rate shocks, for adjustable rate mortgages to 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Id. §___.15(c), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166. 
 129. See id. §___.15(d)(5)(i)(A)–(B), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166. 
 130. See id. §___.15(d)(5)(i)(C), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166. 
 131. See id. §___.15(d)(5)(ii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166.   
 132. See Press Release, FDIC, supra note 26. 
 133. See Credit Risk Retention, §___.15(d)(6), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166. 
 134. 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,122; see Credit Risk Retention, §___.15(d)(6)(ii), 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 24,166. 
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qualify as QRMs, the Agencies propose that the annual interest rate 
must not increase by more than (a) 2% in any twelve month period and 
by (b) 6% over the life of the mortgage transaction.135 Consistent with 
TILA, the Proposed Rules prohibit the QRM from having any points and 
fees in excess of 3% and any pre-payment penalty.136  Also, a QRM is 
not assumable by any person who was not a borrower under the original 
mortgage transaction.137 
4. Debt to Income Ratios (DTI)/ Ability to Repay 
To be a QRM, the Proposed Rules stipulate that the borrower’s 
front-end debt to income ratio (“DTI”) must not exceed 28% and that 
the borrower’s back-end DTI must not exceed 36%.138  The creditor 
must verify that the DTI ratios are based on the maximum interest rate 
that is permitted or required under the mortgage terms during the first 
five years of the transaction and a payment schedule that fully amortizes 
the mortgage over the term of the mortgage transaction.139  These 
proposals are narrower than the requirement of the QM, which imposes 
a back-end DTI of 43%.140 
5. Loan to Value Ratio 
The Proposed Rules require that QRMs meet one of three loan to 
value (“LTV”) ratios, defined as the value of the loan to the fair market 
                                                                                                                 
 135. See id. §___.15(d)(6)(iii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166.  Predatory adjustable rate 
mortgages were particularly hurtful to consumers in the years leading up to the financial 
crisis.  Borrowers took out loans with very low initial (“teaser”) interest rates only to 
see the interest rates increase dramatically (a “shock”) after a few years, which led to 
defaults. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 11. 
 136. Credit Risk Retention, §___.15(d)(6)(iv)–(7), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166.   
 137. Id. §___.15(d)(12), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,167. 
 138. Id. §___.15(d)(8)(i), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166.  A front-end DTI ratio refers to the 
ratio of a borrower’s monthly housing debt to a borrower’s monthly gross income 
whereas a back-end DTI ratio refers to the ratio of a borrower’s total monthly debt to 
the borrower’s monthly gross income. 
 139. See id. §___.15(d)(8)(ii)–(iii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166–67.  Real estate taxes, 
hazard insurance, homeowners’ and condominium association dues, ground rent or 
leasehold payments and special assessments must be included, pro rata, as applicable, in 
computing the requisite DTI ratios. Id. §___.15(d)(8)(iii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166–67. 
 140. See Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards under the Truth in 
Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6407, 6587 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 
12 C.F.R. 1026.43(e)(2)(vi)). 
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value of the property, depending on the type of mortgage transaction at 
issue.141  In a purchase of a one-to-four family property, the LTV ratio at 
closing must not exceed 80%.142  In a rate and term refinancing 
transaction, the LTV ratio at closing must not exceed 75%.143  Finally, in 
a cash out refinancing, the combined LTV ratio at closing must not 
exceed 70%.144  The theory behind imposing strict LTV ratios is that, 
historically, loans with LTV ratios of 80% or less perform better and 
exhibit substantially less default risk than loans with LTV ratios in 
excess of 80%.145  As discussed in Part I.C., leading up to the Financial 
Crisis, however, loans with LTV ratios of 97%-100% dominated 
residential mortgage lending.146  The Proposed Rules require borrowers 
to have sufficient equity in their homes before taking out a mortgage or 
refinancing an existing mortgage to be QRM eligible.147 
6. Down Payment 
The down payment component of the QRM is not mentioned in 
Section 15G nor is there a requirement of a down payment on the part of 
a borrower under the ability to re-pay provisions of Dodd-Frank.  
Nevertheless, the Agencies propose a strong down payment requirement 
based on data that borrowers are less likely to default if they have more 
equity in their homes.148  In the event that the mortgage transaction is for 
the purchase of a one to four family property, the Proposed Rules would 
require the borrower to provide a cash down payment equal to the sum 
of (i) the closing costs payable by the borrower in connection with the 
mortgage transaction, (ii) 20% of the lesser of (a) the estimated market 
value of the one to four family property as determined by a qualifying 
appraisal149 and (b) the purchase price of the one-to-four family 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Credit Risk Retention, §___.15(d)(9), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,167. 
 142. Id. §___.15(d)(9)(i), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,167. 
 143. Id. §___.15(d)(9)(ii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,167. 
 144. Id. §___.15(d)(9)(iii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,167. 
 145. 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,123. 
 146. See Oesterle, supra note 76, at 750. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,124 (citing Austin Kelly, Skin in the Game: Zero Down 
Payment Mortgage Default, 19 J. HOUSING RESEARCH 75 (2008)), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1330132—. 
 149. A QRM must be supported by the written appraisal of an independent third 
party that conforms to generally accepted appraisal standards. See id. §___.15(d)(11), 
76 Fed. Reg. at 24,167. 
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property, and (iii) if the estimated market value of the one-to-four family 
property as determined by a qualifying appraisal is less than the 
purchase price of the property to be paid in connection with the 
mortgage transaction, the difference between these amounts.150  By not 
allowing the borrower to finance closing costs, and by requiring 
borrowers to pay the difference between purchase price of the home and 
the market value of the home, the Proposed Rules seek to ensure that the 
borrower has sufficient equity in the property to minimize risks of 
default.151  
7. Rules Protecting Sponsors and Depositors 
The Proposed Rules seek to balance the interest of encouraging 
sponsors to review the loans collateralizing an ABS transaction against 
the interest of not detering sponsors from issuing an ABS altogether.152  
The Agencies recognize that “despite the use of robust processes and 
procedures, it is possible that one or more loans included in a QRM 
securitization transaction may later be determined to have not met the 
QRM definition due to inadvertent error.”153  Accordingly, a sponsor 
would not lose the protection of the QRM safe harbor provision if they 
were to follow the internal review procedures required by the Proposed 
Rules and take additional measures to remediate any errors.154  
Specifically, a sponsor that has relied on the QRM exemption with 
respect to a securitization transaction would not lose the exemption if, 
after closing the securitization transaction, it is determined that one or 
more of the mortgages collateralizing the ABS do not meet all of the 
qualifying criteria, provided that (1) the sponsor/depositor completed the 
certification requirements set forth in the regulations, (2) the sponsor 
repurchases the loans determined not to be QRMs from the issuing 
entity at a price equal to the remaining principal balance and accrued 
interest on the loans, and (3) the sponsor notifies all investors of the 
ABS of any loans that are required to be repurchased by the sponsor.155 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See id. §___.15(d)(10), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,167. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,128. 
 154. See Credit Risk Retention, §___.15(e), 76 Fed. Reg. 24,167. 
 155. Id. 
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C. RE-SECURITIZATION PRODUCTS 
The Proposed Rules do not allow a securitizer to avoid retaining 
risk by creating re-securitizations that re-tranche the credit risk of the 
underlying ABS.  Two conditions must be met in order for a re-
securitization product to be exempt from risk retention.156  First, the re-
securitized assets must be collateralized solely by existing ABS that 
were structured in compliance with Section 15G.157  Second, the re-
securitization may involve the issuance of only a single class of ABS 
interests.158  Consequently, a securitizer would be required to retain at 
least 5% of the risk of a CDO (a product that re-tranches an ABS), even 
if all of the assets that underlie the ABS were QRMs (or in the case of a 
non-mortgage transaction, even where all of the underlying assets were 
exempt from risk retention).159 
D. TREATMENT OF GSES AND GOVERNMENT-RELATED EXEMPTIONS 
The Proposed Rules exempt loans owned, insured or guaranteed by 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from risk retention while under the 
conservatorship of the FHFA.160  To the Agencies, the GSEs’ guarantee 
of timely payment coupled with capital support from the Federal 
Government satisfies the risk retention requirements.161  The rules with 
respect to the Premium Capture Account and the prohibitions on 
hedging also do not apply to the GSEs while under the conservatorship 
of the FHFA.  The Proposed Rules also exempt any security backed by 
the Federal Government or any state government from risk retention. 
                                                                                                                 
 156. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,138. 
 157. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,138–39.  
 158. Id.  The Agencies describe the types of re-securitized bonds that would meet 
this exemption, see 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,138–39, but further discussion of re-
securitization products is beyond the scope of this paper. The important takeaway is 
that this particular proposed rule would prohibit the most common and dangerous forms 
of re-securitization transactions (e.g., the CDO), see supra notes 1–9, 41–57 and 
accompanying text, from being exempt from risk retention. 
 159. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,138; see also Credit Risk Retention, §___.21(a)(5), 76 
Fed. Reg. at 24,172–73. 
 160. 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,112. 
 161. Id.  The Proposed Rules with respect to the Premium Capture Account, 
§___.12, as well as prohibitions on hedging, §___.14(b), (c) and (d), do not apply to the 
GSEs while in conservatorship. 
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III. MARKET IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED RISK RETENTION RULES 
Part III of this Comment provides a market analysis of the 
Proposed Rules.  The accomplishments of the Proposed Rules in 
attacking the flaws in the pre-crisis securitization market are discussed 
followed by a survey of the major concerns that the proposed risk 
retention framework raises, including concerns raised by consumer 
advocates, mortgage originators, financiers, lawmakers and academics. 
A. THE MERITS OF THE PROPOSED RISK RETENTION RULES: HOW THEY 
ADDRESS KEY PROBLEMS IN THE PRE-CRISIS MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION 
PROCESS 
As they apply to residential mortgages, the Proposed Risk 
Retention Rules target the incentive misalignment that plagued 
mortgage securitization in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis by 
closely aligning the economic interests of securitizers and investors.  In 
doing so, the Agencies define the QRM exemption narrowly, inhibit 
securitizers from profiting off of arranging an RMBS unless the RMBS 
pays off all investors in full,162 and prohibit the type of detrimental 
hedging activities witnessed in the years leading up to the Financial 
Crisis.163  These proposals, working in conjunction with other provisions 
of Dodd-Frank, address two goals of paramount importance: 1) deterring 
predatory securitization and excessive liquidity creation that contributed 
to the Financial Crisis and 2) keeping private label mortgage 
securitization flexible enough to allow capital to flow to borrowers who 
pose low default risks but would not meet the QRM exemption.164 
1. Deterring Predatory Securitization and Excessive Liquidity Creation 
The narrow definition of the QRM is intended to change private 
label mortgage securitization markets so that most RMBS transactions 
require risk retention on the part of the securitizer.  The Agencies 
defined the QRM exemption narrowly, because, in the words of Sheila 
Bair, “the QRM is the exception not the rule.”165  Moreover, the 
prohibitions on hedging and the establishment of the Premium Capture 
Account ensure that incentives are aligned in the securitization chain.  
                                                                                                                 
 162. See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
 164. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 165. See Press Release, FDIC, supra note 26. 
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By inhibiting sponsors from hedging against their required exposure to 
an ABS, the Proposed Rules prohibit securitizers from taking positions 
directly adverse to investors (i.e., by purchasing CDS) in the ABS they 
arrange.166  The Premium Capture Account deters imprudent conduct on 
the part of securitizers by ensuring that securitizers may only profit off 
of a securitization transaction if investors are first paid off in full.167  
These measures ensure that securitizers have an incentive to arrange 
only those securitizations that are safe and have a high potential for 
success. 
Had the Citigroup CDO discussed at the beginning of this 
Comment been arranged in a securitization structure governed by the 
Proposed Rules, the results would have been far different.  Citigroup 
would have had to retain at least $25 million in the $500 million 
transaction, would not have been able to enter into CDSs against the 
CDO, and the $160 million in fees it collected for arranging the CDO 
would have been held in the Premium Capture Account to serve as a 
first loss position for the benefit of investors.168  Given the financial 
incentives, it is highly unlikely that Citigroup would arrange this deal if 
it were doomed to failure, as it would suffer a $25 million loss and 
would not collect any fees.  Prior to the crisis, financial incentives led to 
originators and securitizers fraudulently passing off subprime mortgages 
as investment grade to investors because they had the ability to profit off 
of an ABS or CDO simply by arranging it, or, worse still, by betting 
against it.169  Under the new framework, a securitizer’s ultimate fate is 
inextricably tied to that of the investors, which, in turn, should give 
them an incentive to pay close attention to the behavior and practices of 
mortgage originators.170  Forcing securitizers to monitor the loan quality 
of the assets they securitize should deter excessive mortgage origination 
on loan terms that borrowers simply cannot afford, as these deals would 
threaten a securitizer’s ability to collect fees.171 
                                                                                                                 
 166. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra notes 92, 110–21 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
 170. Press Release, FDIC, supra note 26 (arguing that skin-in-the-game rules will 
assure that originators and securitizers cannot escape the consequences of their own 
lending practices). 
 171. See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text. 
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2. Merits of the Narrowness of the QRM Definition 
Other than incentivizing a structure in which most securitization 
transactions involve risk retention on the part of securitizers, a narrow 
QRM also provides the private label mortgage securitization market 
with some needed flexibility.  According to Bair, the QRM should 
become the exception in the mortgage market, while the non-QRM risk 
retention loan should become the dominant form of mortgage 
securitization.172  It is also hoped that a narrow QRM excludes enough 
high quality home loans such that ABS backed by high quality non-
QRMs “may be routinely issued and purchased by a wide variety of 
investors.”173  The rule makers explain that their study of mortgage 
lending strongly suggests that the loans that meet the minimum QRM 
standards carry low default risk even during adverse economic 
conditions, such as a period of high unemployment coupled with sharply 
declining home prices.174  They note that certain safe mortgage loans 
will be left out of the QRM definition, thereby making the market for 
such securities relatively liquid.175  By contrast, the broader the 
definition of QRM, the more convoluted the exemption becomes, and 
the less liquid the market ordinarily would be for residential mortgages 
falling outside of the QRM definition.176 
B. CONCERNS OVER THE PROPOSED RISK RETENTION REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK 
The Proposed Rules have ironically united mortgage originators, 
financiers, lawmakers and consumer advocates alike in fierce opposition 
to the QRM.177  The arguments generally assume that the additional 
                                                                                                                 
 172. Press Release, FDIC, supra note 26. 
 173. Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090, 24,118 (proposed Apr. 29, 2011). 
 174. Id. at 24,117–18. 
 175. Id. at 24,118. The Agencies explain that “incorporating all of the tradeoffs that 
may prudently be made as part of a secured underwriting process into a regulation 
would be very difficult without introducing a level of complexity and cost that could 
undermine any incentives for sponsors to securitize, and originators to originate, 
QRMs.” Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 27; Josh Silver & Archana Pradhan, Nat’l Cmty. 
Reinvestment Coal., The Impact of the Proposed Qualified Residential Mortgage 
Definition on Home Opportunity in America (2011), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/73355463?access_key=key-13t4p3yx457mnaevylg0; 
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costs of skin-in-the-game in non-QRM loans will ultimately be passed 
on to consumers.178  As a result, most commentators suspect that the 
QRM loan will be the most common loan on the market whereas the 
non-QRM will be a costly alternative.179  Consequently, commentators 
propose that the definition of the QRM be expanded. 
Economists speculate180 that securitizers will require a higher return 
on the 5% stake they hold than investors usually require, which, in turn, 
will necessitate higher interest rates on non-QRM loans.181  It is argued 
that securitizers will require additional returns primarily due to capital 
constraints.182  Commentators fear that risk retention coupled with 
additional capital constraints will dis-incentivize non-QRM lending, and 
potentially make non-QRM loans prohibitively expensive, or even put 
private label mortgage lending out of business altogether.183  Whereas 
regulators forecast that the costs of skin-in-the-game will increase the 
                                                                                                                 
Am. Securitization Forum, ASF Risk Retention Letter to Joint Regulators: Executive 
Summary (2011), available at http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ 
ASF_Risk_Retention_Comment_Letter_Executive_Summary.pdf; Nat’l Ass’n of 
Realtors, Letter Regarding Credit Risk Retention Proposed Rule (2011), available at 
http://www.ksefocus.com/billdatabase/clientfiles/172/3/1292.pdf; Jon Prior, More 
Lawmakers Join Major Push to Reduce QRM Down Payment, HOUSINGWIRE (June 
20, 2011, 3:56 pm), http://www.housingwire.com/2011/06/20/more-lawmakers-join-
major-push-to-reduce-qrm-down-payment; Davis Polk, Proposed Credit Risk Retention 
Rules Raise Serious Concerns (2011), available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/ 
Publication/fb3d913d-f3b6-45c9-9657-003251fd80cb/Presentation/Publication 
Attachment/3e99bb31-2cac-4063a6370b9a4cfa61f3/060111ProposedCreditRisk.pdf. 
 178. See, e.g., ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 29, at 5. 
 179. See, e.g., id. 
 180. It is important to note that any projection on how private label mortgage 
interest rates will be affected by skin-in-the-game is speculative at best. There is simply 
not enough hard data to predict, with confidence, how the market will react. See 
GEITHNER, supra note 10, at 6 (suggesting that studies on the implications of risk 
retention are limited). 
 181. See ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 29, at 5.  Reasoning by analogy, Zandi and 
DeRitis argue that securitizers will require a significantly higher return than that of 
investors because mortgage insurers currently require a 15% return for keeping some 
skin-in-the-game. The economists argue that if the required return for securitizers was 
6% higher than that of investors, interest rates would increase by 30 basis points, and if 
securitizers’ required return was 9% higher than that of investors, interest rates would 
increase by 45 basis points. Id. 
 182. See, e.g., id. 
 183. See, e.g., id.; see also Davis Polk, supra note 177, at 4 (suggesting that the 
premium capture reserve account would have a “significant and negative impact” on the 
volume of private label securitizations). 
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interest rates on non-QRM loans by 10 to 15 basis points, commentators 
forecast that interest rates could increase by as much as 100184 to 185185 
basis points. 
The potential for skin-in-the-game to make home loans more 
expensive creates a concern that homeownership will become very 
difficult to attain.186  Consistent with regulatory intent that seeks to make 
the QRM the exception to the mortgage market, commentators point out 
that most home loans originated in the last decade were not QRMs.187  
Commentators fear that this phenomenon is particularly concerning for 
low-income borrowers.188  Because historical data suggests that 
minorities and low-income individuals are especially unlikely to qualify 
for QRM loans today, commentators fear that the Proposed Rules will 
ultimately make home ownership even more difficult for these groups to 
attain.189   
On the structuring side, the American Securitization Forum 
(“ASF”) is concerned that the Premium Capture Account is “lethal” to 
the securitization market.190  According to the ASF, the Premium 
                                                                                                                 
 184. ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 29, at 3, 6. 
 185. See Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, supra note 177, at 19. Of course, doomsday 
projections from mortgage brokers must be taken with a grain of salt. 
 186. See, e.g., id. 
 187. See ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 26, at 2–3 (arguing that only one-fifth of 
mortgage originations between 1997 and 2009 were QRMs and only one-third of 
originations made in 2009 alone, the year lending standards were tightest, would have 
met the Proposed Rules definition of a QRM). 
 188. See, e.g., Silver & Pradhan, supra note 174, at 2. 
 189. The down payment requirement in the Proposed Rules has been singled out for 
criticism because of its potential disparate effect on low-income groups and minorities. 
See, e.g., Silver & Pradhan, supra note 177, at 2 (arguing that a down payment of 20% 
reduces QRM ineligibility for many while only marginally having an impact on default 
rates). Senators sent letters to the Agencies on May 26, 2011, contending that the 
Proposed Rules go beyond the intent of Dodd-Frank in implementing stringent down 
payment requirements. See Comment Letter on QRM from 39 Members of the U.S. 
Senate to the Agencies (May 26, 2011), available at http://www.hagan.senate.gov/files/ 
images/SenateQRMLetter.pdf.  The National Association of Realtors makes especially 
troubling predictions about the ability of middle to low-income families, and certain 
minorities in particular, to obtain QRM loans. See Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, supra note 
177, at 15. Similarly, a big law partner suggests that the QRM means the death of the 
American Dream. See Richard J. Andreano, Jr., Death of the American Dreams Focus 
on QRM, 128 BANKING L.J. 714 (2011). 
 190. The Impact of Dodd-Frank on Customers, Credit, and Job Creators: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. 
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Capture Account adds an additional skin-in-the-game requirement on 
securitizers on top of the 5% requirement that may disincentivize 
sponsors from structuring securitizations altogether, thereby making 
homeownership more costly for non-prime borrowers in particular.191  
This concern is well founded.  For instance, in a securitization pool 
where all the mortgages have thirty year terms, the current structure 
would inhibit a securitizer from collecting fees for three decades until it 
is certain that investors in an ABS are paid in full.192  Although this 
structure would force a securitizer to have its skin-in-the-game for the 
long-haul, it appears to be impracticable, only leaving an incentive to 
structure a securitization for financing purposes.193   Moreover, this fee 
structure would make it very difficult for the private sector to displace 
the government’s involvement in the mortgage market while the GSEs 
remain exempt from the risk retention rules while under the 
conservatorship of the FHFA.194 
ASF also advocates for a QRM blend exception, which would 
allow a securitizer to mix non-QRM and QRM loans in an ABS and 
retain 5% of the risk of the non-QRM loans in the ABS only; a safe-
harbor for loans that are securitized well after origination (about one to 
three years); and a sunset safe harbor provision that allows a securitizer 
                                                                                                                 
on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Tom Deutsch, Executive Director, 
American Securitization Forum, at 3), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/ 
uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ba16-wstate-tdeutsch-20120710.pdf (“Some rules like the 
premium capture cash reserve account are so lethal to the RMBS and CMBS markets 
that those markets are predicted to become relegated to history books for all of those 
other than a few niche players serving extremely limited segments of the market, if that 
rule were to be put into place as proposed.”). 
 191. Understanding the Implications and Consequences of the Proposed Rule on 
Risk Retention: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Sponsored 
Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 15 (2011) (statement of  Tom 
Deutsch, Executive Director, American Securitization Forum), available at 
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF_HFSC_Risk_Retention_Te
stimony_4-14-11.pdf. 
 192. See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text. 
 193. The Impact of Dodd-Frank on Customers, Credit, and Job Creators, supra note 
190, at 8 (statement of Tom Deutsch); but see ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 29, at 4 
(acknowledging that securitizers’ ability to cover costs upfront under the Proposed 
Rules is in doubt but predicting that regulators will clarify that securitizers will be able 
to retain a standardized fee—that is not required to be held in the premium capture cash 
reserve account—for arranging an ABS). 
 194. The Impact of Dodd-Frank on Customers, Credit, and Job Creators, supra note 
190, at 9. 
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to shed its skin-in-the-game if the loans have performed for a reasonable 
period of time.195  ASF also requests that the prohibitions on hedging 
only apply for a specified number of years after the securitization closes 
so that sponsors are allowed to hedge against their exposures if market 
conditions change.196 
In contrast to the critiques above, which find the rulemaking too 
onerous on securitizers and borrowers, some scholars’ criticism cuts in 
the other direction.197  These academics are concerned that skin-in-the-
game does not inform investors of the credit risk of mortgage 
securitization products and cannot prevent risky lending from 
threatening the solvency of the financial system in real-time.198  These 
scholars would prohibit securitizing mortgage loans altogether if the 
mortgages to be securitized do not conform to certain “plain” 
standardized criteria with low default risk. 199  These scholars note that 
Section 941 leaves the door open to such standardization by allowing 
the Agencies to propose risk retention rules onerous enough to deter 
securitization or origination of non-QRM loans altogether.200 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: WHAT THE FINAL RULES SHOULD 
LOOK LIKE FOR THE RMBS MARKET 
Although private label securities account for only 5% of the 
secondary mortgage market,201 there is strong reason to believe that the 
risk retention rules will have a significant impact on the mortgage 
                                                                                                                 
 195. See, e.g., American Securitization Forum, supra note 177, at 4. 
 196. See Understanding the Implications and Consequences of the Proposed Rule 
on Risk Retention, supra note 191, at 197 (statement of Tom Deutsch). 
 197. See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 30, at 1256–58 (arguing that niche 
mortgage loans should not be securitized at all but should remain entirely on bank 
balance sheets); see also Adam J. Levitin et al., The Dodd-Frank Act and Housing 
Finance: Can it Restore Private Risk Capital to the Securitization Market?, 29 YALE J. 
ON REG. 155 (2012). 
 198. Levitin et al., The Dodd-Frank Act and Housing Finance, supra note 197, at 
164. 
 199. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 30, at 1256–57. 
 200. Id. at 1256 n.279. 
 201. Jon Prior, Pending Conforming Loan Limit Decrease Puts California on Edge, 
HOUSINGWIRE (June 23, 2011, 1:04 PM), http://www.housingwire.com/news/pending-
conforming-loan-limit-decrease-puts-california-edge.  As previously mentioned, RMBS 
products arranged by the GSEs are exempt from risk retention, restrictions on hedging 
and premium capture while under the conservatorship of the FHFA. See supra Part 
II.D.  
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market in the near future.  A congressional study on the future of the 
GSEs reveals that the ability of the GSEs to exit conservatorship will 
require a return to financial viability, which would require the 
generation of interest among private investors to hold an equity stake in 
the GSEs. 202  Whether such investor interest is sufficient to allow the 
GSEs to stand on their own would in turn depend upon the equity 
investment appetite for an entity that issues RMBS products.203  
Consequently, the creation of a safe, well-functioning and profitable 
private label mortgage securitization market under the framework of the 
final risk retention rules that is able to establish investor confidence in 
entities that issue RMBS products, may be crucial in determining 
whether the GSEs will exit conservatorship without further government 
assistance.204    
Further, it is worth noting that there has been recent activity in the 
private label mortgage market that suggests that there is still interest in 
generating private label RMBS products despite the announcement of 
the supposedly “onerous” Proposed Rules.205  Shell Point Financial filed 
a shelf registration to issue RMBS securities products,206 Redwood 
Trust207 (another private company) recently completed its fifth RMBS 
transaction of the year, and Residential Capital’s mortgage servicing and 
origination units were sold in a bankruptcy auction to Ocwen Captial 
and Walter Investment Management Corp. for $3 billion.208  Whether 
such deals will become increasingly commonplace or be considered an 
aberration will also depend on the structure and substance of the final 
risk retention rules.209 
                                                                                                                 
 202. N. ERIC WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34661, FANNIE MAE’S AND 
FREDDIE MAC’S FINANCIAL PROBLEMS 15 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/misc/RL34661.pdf. 
 203. Id. at 15. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See supra notes 177–94 and accompanying text. 
 206. Jacob Gaffney, Shellpoint Files to Issue Private Mortgage Bonds, 
HOUSINGWIRE (Oct. 15, 2012, 3:47 PM), available at http://www.housingwire.com/ 
news/shellpoint-files-issue-private-mortgage-bonds. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Press Release, Ocwen Fin. Corp.,  Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC and Walter 
Investment Management Corp. Awarded Winning Bid for ResCap’s Mortgage 
Servicing and Origination Platform (Oct. 24, 2012), available at 
http://shareholders.ocwen.com/releases.cfm. 
 209. Accord Press Release, FDIC, supra note 26. 
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This section advocates for final rules that maintain the narrow 
QRM exemption, require risk to be retained until maturity, and keep the 
prohibition on hedging and the establishment of a Premium Capture 
Account in place; however, this section argues that a securitizer should 
be allowed to collect profits from the Premium Capture Account, at the 
discretion of a trustee, after three to five years, if an RMBS has 
performed well, to ensure a financial incentive still remains for 
securitizers to arrange RMBS transactions.  This Comment is written in 
hopes that these recommendations would best create a safe mortgage 
securitization market that generates investor confidence in both private 
label RMBS products and equity investor interest in entities that issue 
such products, such that credit may flow to borrowers who are actually 
able to afford homes and that the GSEs have a viable option of leaving 
conservatorship without further government assistance. 
A. DEFENDING A NARROW QRM EXEMPTION 
The final risk retention rules should maintain the definition of the 
QRM outlined in the Proposed Rules, including the controversial down 
payment requirement.  Both rule makers and critics admit that borrowers 
who pose a low default risk will be denied QRM loans under the 
Proposed Rules.210  While some critics see this as an outright bar to 
homeownership for certain groups, it is at least equally plausible that the 
market will realize that there are non-QRM loans of investment quality, 
thereby allowing borrowers to take out affordable non-QRM loans at 
reasonable rates.211  The economic literature demonstrates that in the 
years prior to the Financial Crisis, demand for investment-grade quality 
home loans is what increased credit availability to borrowers.212  The 
new risk retention structure in which the QRM is narrowly defined 
                                                                                                                 
 210. Joe Adler, FDIC’s Bair Would Rather Eliminate QRM from Risk Retention 
Rule, BANK INVESTMENT CONSULTANT (June 10, 2011), available at 
http://www.bankinvestmentconsultant.com/news/FDIC-banks-risk-management-QRM-
2673729-1.html.  In acknowledgement of the broad pushback against the QRM, Sheila 
Bair retorted, “If we could just get rid of  [QRM] it would be fine with me, just making 
sure that the [risk retention] is 5% [for all mortgage loans].” Id.  Bair maintains that the 
premium on non-QRM loans should only be 10 to 15 basis points and that the non-
QRM loan will be the most common loan on the private label market. Id.  Of course, 
getting rid of the QRM would require amending Dodd-Frank, which would open up a 
can of worms that could cause more harm than good.  Rule makers should work within 
the framework given by the legislation.  
 211. See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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should encourage the origination and securitization of prudently 
underwritten home loans that will inspire investor confidence in such 
products and in the entities that issue them.213 
Of course, a narrow QRM (and new regulations thereunder) will 
inevitably reign in the free flow of capital seen during the pre-crisis 
days—this seems right given that the pre-Financial Crisis market was 
artificially created.214  This token critique of the risk retention rules, that 
it scalps capital market liquidity, may prove beneficial if it prevents 
excess leveraging on a consumer and corporate level.  Left unregulated, 
securitization encouraged over-borrowing, both from consumers who 
sought home loans and financial institutions that borrowed against 
mortgage securities products.215  Before pointing out that skin-in-the-
game will decrease liquidity, it is helpful to be mindful that the inflated 
rate of household borrowing seen prior to the Financial Crisis in the 
United States was unsustainable.216  Further, at some point, the federal 
funds rate will have to increase, and worse still, the eagerness of net 
lenders to finance American borrowing will cool.217  Some economists 
have forecasted the shift from net-debtor country to net-creditor country 
as potentially catastrophic given our current household borrowing 
level.218  I am not suggesting that skin-in-the-game is a potential solution 
to the balance of payments problems, but a cursory mention of these 
issues highlights that excessive liquidity and leveraging are 
unsustainable in the long run.  Addressing over-borrowing is a concern 
that should be at least pari-passu with the expansion of homeownership.  
If a narrow QRM that includes a down payment requirement means that 
                                                                                                                 
 213. See Press Release, FDIC, supra note 26. 
 214. See e.g., Oesterle, supra note 76, at 759–60. 
 215. See supra Part I.B. 
 216. See, e.g., CHARLES ROXBURGH ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, DEBT 
AND DELEVERAGING: UNEVEN PROGRESS ON THE PATH TO GROWTH 2–4 (Jan. 2012), 
available at http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/research/financial_markets/ 
uneven_progress_on_the_path_to_growth (arguing that sustainable household 
borrowing must be measured at rates observed prior to the housing bubble and that the 
U.S. economy is only half-way towards deleveraging to a natural rate); accord Stijn 
Claessens, Shedding Debt, FIN. & DEV., June 2012, at 23, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/06/pdf/claessens.pdf. 
 217. See, e.g., Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, The US as a Net Debtor: The 
Sustainability of the US External Imbalances 6–7 (Nov. 2004), available at 
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/nroubini/papers/Roubini-Setser-US-External-
Imbalances.pdf. 
 218. See id at 6–7. 
2013] DEFENDING SKIN-IN-THE-GAME 445 
individuals have to save more to attain homeownership, this result may 
prove more socially desirable than recklessly expanding homeownership 
by having individuals borrow at unsustainable rates.219  In contrast, 
omission of the down payment restriction would result in a truly absurd 
result: Dodd-Frank regulations would not impose on lenders an 
obligation to require consumers to retain any equity in their homes to 
avail themselves of safe-harbor provisions under Title 14 and Section 
941 of the Act.220 
Should it become apparent that homeownership has become a 
significant impediment to disadvantaged groups due to the QRM, then 
regulators should craft specific rules to target such distressed 
neighborhoods221 under their authority to establish exemptions in the 
public interest ex post.222  Moreover, these exemptions should be crafted 
narrowly.  As we saw in the 1990s, government housing initiatives that 
were targeted at underprivileged communities led to lax lending 
standards that were effectively given to everyone, including real estate 
speculators, second home buyers, and wealthy homeowners.223  It would 
not be desirable policy to subsidize those markets in the name of 
ameliorating the disparate effects of income inequality.224  In addition to 
making the market for non-QRM loans less liquid, expanding the QRM 
exemption may re-open the door to shady lending practices seen in the 
pre-Financial Crisis securitization market, as more loans would then be 
structured in a market where risk retention is not required.225 
B. MODIFYING THE PREMIUM CAPTURE ACCOUNT; MAINTAINING 
DURATION OF RISK RETENTION AND RESTRICTIONS ON HEDGING 
It is important to keep the interests of securitizers and those of 
investors closely aligned to deter the creation of products that profit 
                                                                                                                 
 219. See supra notes 78–87 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.  
 221. See Oesterle, supra note 76, at 759–60. 
 222. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-11(c)(1)(G)(i), (iii) (West 2012) (giving rule makers the 
authority to exempt securities from risk retention, particularly those backed by state 
governments, if in the public interest and for the protection of investors).  Or perhaps 
state governments could remediate disparate effects of income inequality themselves by 
guaranteeing a subset of home loans to targeted communities. See id. (exempting ABS 
backed by any state of the United States or by the United States from risk retention). 
 223. See supra Part I.C. 
 224. See Oesterle, supra note 76, at 760. 
 225. See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text; accord Press Release, FDIC, 
supra note 26. 
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securitizers but harm investors, borrowers and the economy at large.226  
At the same time, a balance must be struck between this interest and the 
interest of preserving a financial incentive for financial institutions to 
participate in structured finance altogether so that credit may flow to 
worthy borrowers.227  The Premium Capture Account established by the 
Proposed Rules is thus needed but requires modification. 
The reserve account is needed so that profits collected from 
arranging a securitization transaction do not offset the required risk 
retention that a securitizer retains.228  For instance, in a $1 billion 
transaction, if a securitizer collects $75 million in fees and retains 5% or 
$50 million of the ABS, regardless of what ultimately becomes of the 
ABS, the securitizer will receive a net profit of at least $25 million. The 
Premium Capture Account in the Proposes Rules would require such 
amount to be held in trust to serve as a first loss position for the benefit 
of investors until the ABS pays investors off in full.229 
 This proposal, however, is too onerous in that amounts from the 
Premium Capture Account cannot be realized by a securitizer for many 
years (potentially ten to thirty years depending on the duration of the 
underlying mortgage loans), which, practically speaking, would 
eliminate the incentive to arrange a securitization except for financing 
purposes.230  Financiers are driven by realizing short-term profits and 
such a rule does not put the private sector on fair footing to compete 
with Fannie and Freddie securitizations while under the FHFA.231 
As a result, the final risk retention rules should modify the 
Premium Capture Account such that it holds a securitizer’s profits in 
trust to serve as a first loss position in an ABS for the first three to five 
years after the RMBS transaction closes.232  After this point, the trustee 
                                                                                                                 
 226. See, e.g., supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra notes 187–94 and accompanying text. 
 228. See Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090, 24,096, 24,113–14 (proposed 
Apr. 29, 2011). 
 229. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text. 
 230. See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text.  
 232. Empirical research suggests that default rates decline substantially once a 
mortgage performs for three years. See, e.g., SHANE M. SHERLUND, BD. OF GOVERNORS 
OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MORTGAGE DEFAULTS 5–6 (2010), available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/region/foreclosure_resource_center/mo
re_mortgage_defaults.pdf. Default rates flatten further after three years from 
origination. Id. 
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of the account should be allowed to release all or a portion of the funds 
back to a securitizer at her discretion if the ABS has generally made 
timely payments to investors.  For fairness, the trustee could have 
fiduciary obligations to both investors in the ABS and the securitizer, 
and would only inhibit profit collection for a securitizer if there is a 
substantial risk that the ABS is not as valuable as marketed to investors 
at closing.  This rule would deter a securitizer from arranging a 
transaction that is destined for failure while at the same time allow a 
securitizer to realize a profit from arranging a healthy ABS within a 
reasonable time-frame, thereby preserving a realistic financial incentive 
for private entities to participate in structured finance.233 
The duration of a securitizer’s required 5% risk retention, however, 
should continue until the ABS reaches maturity and should take the 
form of horizontal retention of the most subordinated tranche in an ABS.  
This way, a securitizer has an economic interest that is aligned with that 
of investors over the duration of the ABS and absorbs the riskiest 
position in an ABS, thereby maintaining a securitizers incentive to 
scrutinize loan-underwriting standards closely.234  In turn, this retention 
should give investors confidence that they are not being duped into 
purchasing RMBS products that fail in later years and should hopefully 
generate enough investor demand in RMBS products to keep mortgage 
rates from becoming prohibitively costly.235  The prohibitions on 
hedging (except for the limited purpose for hedging against interest rate 
and foreign exchange risk) in the Proposed Rules236 should remain intact 
in the final rulemaking to ensure that the interests of securitizers are 
never adverse to those of investors and that the incentive to monitor loan 
quality is not offset, as seen in the years leading up to the Financial 
Crisis.237 
CONCLUSION 
The failures of the originate-to-distribute model of securitization 
demonstrated how powerful financial incentives can be in influencing 
                                                                                                                 
 233. Cf. supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text. 
 234. See Press Release, FDIC, supra note 26; see also supra notes 110–11 and 
accompanying text; Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090, 24,102 (proposed Apr. 
29, 2011). 
 235. Mortgage credit is supply driven as seen in the years leading up to the financial 
crisis. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text. 
 237. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
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the activities of intermediaries in the mortgage securitization process.238  
Financial incentives led to knowingly shady activity on the part of 
originators, securitizers and credit ratings agencies all for the purpose of 
generating profits.239  Thus, forcing securitizers to maintain a financial 
interest in the products they distribute is likely crucial to correcting the 
flaws in private label mortgage lending that caused the Financial 
Crisis.240 
The Agencies undertook a daunting task in proposing risk retention 
rules in a previously unregulated area of structured finance.241  
Commentators are right to point out that homeownership will be more 
difficult to attain as a result of the Proposed Rules, but they fail to 
explain why increasing homeownership is a national goal that takes 
precedence over all others, including curtailing the excessive leveraging 
and unsustainable borrowing that led to the Financial Crisis.242  The 
Proposed Risk Retention Rules deserve praise for crafting a narrow safe 
harbor and prohibiting a securitizer from profiting off of arranging a 
securitization pool if it ultimately fails.243  These proposals ensure that 
most RMBS products would be arranged in a system where risk 
retention is required, thereby giving securitizers a financial incentive to 
monitor underwriting quality.  This is crucial to making mortgage 
securitization safe in a world filled with investors with a penchant for 
irrational exuberance; where localized booms and busts have broad 
macroeconomic consequences.244  These accomplishments should not be 
                                                                                                                 
 238. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I. 
 239. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
 241. See Press Release, FDIC, supra note 26. 
 242. See supra Parts I.A.–I.C. 
 243. This is not to say that the risk retention rules are the panacea for fixing the 
causes of the financial crisis.  The risk retention provisions compliment other parts of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, which are intended to make securitization and mortgage lending 
safer and more transparent. This includes restricting mortgage loan origination unless a 
lender has verified a borrower’s ability to repay, regulating credit ratings agencies, 
requiring more review and disclosures with respect to the assets underlying ABS pools; 
vesting the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau with the power to regulate mortgage 
lending; regulation of dangerous financial interconnectedness and the creation of the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council—the ultimate stopper in the regulatory overhaul. 
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, §§ 163, 610, 932, 935, 936, 943, 945, 124 Stat. 1376, 1422, 1611, 1872, 1884–85, 
1897, 1898 (2010). 
 244. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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lost when regulators sit down and craft the final rules.  At the same time, 
it is paramount that regulators ease the consequences of the Premium 
Capture Account such that a securitizer may realize some profit off of 
arranging a healthy ABS transaction a few years after a transaction 
closes, thereby keeping private label interest in arranging ABS 
transactions alive.245  Regulators should proceed with caution in easing 
other requirements in the Proposed Rules, however, as their primary 
goals should be to make securitization safe by deterring excessive 
leveraging and liquidity creation that could cause widespread economic 
harm.  This in turn should hopefully create a healthy private label 
mortgage securitization market that generates enough investment 
demand for RMBS products and equity stakes in the entities that issue 
them to allow for the flow of sustainable credit to the housing market. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 245. See supra notes 232–33 and accompanying text. 
